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1 Introduction 
The Meaning of Meaning is an influential book published by Charles Kay 
Ogden (1889–1957) and Ivor Armstrong Richards (1893-1979) (from now 
on O&R) in January 1923. It describes a theory of meaning, more 
specifically trying to determine the nature of meaning and why 
misunderstandings frequently occur between people. Even if the book is 
now considered as “dated”1, it has been intensively read, especially in the 
English speaking world2 where it has been widely used as a textbook in 
                                                
1 According to the CTLF website (Corpus de textes linguistiques fondamentaux; the note 
concerning Ogden and Richard has been written by H. Portine — notice 5316, 
http://ctlf.ens-lsh.fr/n_fiche.asp?num=5316). The text says: «  Cet ouvrage a joué un rôle 
important en philosophie du langage au cours de la première moitié du XXe siècle. En 
témoignent les nombreuses rééditions. Il est plutôt considéré de nos jours comme un 
événement important mais daté ». 
2 The complete title and the main editions before the second World War are the following: 
The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the 
semantics; the book is still much cited and raises problems which are wide 
open, like the notion of meaning itself, the relationships between words and 
objects, and communication problems. Therefore, it seems worth exploring 
why this book is still influential nowadays, as can be seen in various fields 
from computational linguistics to communication studies, via the Semantic 
Web.  
In this article, we briefly present O&R’ theory; we then look at the way it 
has been received right after its publication and more precisely we consider 
some of the criticisms made at the time, – especially by Wittgenstein (1889–
1951) (O&R initially thought that their book was an answer to some of the 
philosophical problems raised by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, where the 
philosopher raised important questions related to semantics). In the last 
section, we see how some of the paradoxes emerging from O&R’ theory are 
still vivid today, especially for the computational linguistics community.  
                                                                                                                        
Science of Symbolism. Co-authored by C. K. Ogden and A.K. Richards. With an 
introduction by J. P. Postgate, and supplementary essays by Bronislaw Malinowski, ‘The 
Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages’, and F. G. Crookshank, ‘The Importance of a 
Theory of Signs and a Critique of Language in the Study of Medicine’. London and New 
York, 1923. 1st: 1923 (Preface Date: Jan. 1923); 2nd: 1927 (Preface Date: June 1926); 3rd: 
1930 (Preface Date: Jan. 1930); 4th: 1936 (Preface Date: May 1936); 5th: 1938 (Preface 
Date: June 1938); 8th: 1946 (Preface Date: May 1946); NY: 1989 (with a preface by 
Umberto Eco). 
 
2 Ogden and Richards’ theory abridged 
From O&R’ theory, people think words have a unique, precise meaning, 
which (according to them) is wrong. This error leads to misunderstandings. 
The authors then claim that we need to solve these problems to enhance 
understanding between people.  
2.1 The semiotic triangle 
The book is mainly focused on words. Words are considered as symbols that 
conventionally stand for objects of the world (the referent). This relation 
between a word and an object is made through the image of the object in the 
brain (the reference). Therefore, meaning depends from the relationships 
between the word (the symbol), the image in the brain (the reference) and 
the object in the world (the referent). The links between these three poles 
describe a triangle traditionally known as the “semiotic triangle”. In fact, 
there is no direct link between the word and the object, but the image of the 
object in the brain is a kind of mandatory go-between that introduces a 
personal and emotive dimension into meaning.  
 
 Note that this semiotic triangle is not new and has not been initially  
introduced by O&R. For example, comparable ideas are already present in 
Charles Pierce’s (1839–1914) works; this is clearly mentioned as such in the 
appendix of O&R’ book (p. 279). However, O&R popularized the semiotic 
triangle. The book will be largely studied in English speaking universities. It 
is still widely used and accepted as such, e.g. in communication departments.  
2.2 Emotive language 
According to O&R, people believe that every word has a precise, correct 
meaning. But in reality, meaning is largely driven by personal experience 
(words evoke different things or feelings, based on past experience), 
therefore, the same word means different things to different people. As a 
matter of fact, for O&R it is because of personal experience that people use 
words in such or such manner, which leads to misunderstandings.  
O&R then propose a series of solutions to avoid misunderstandings. It is 
possible to reduce ambiguity by 1) Providing clear definitions (specify what 
is included in the meaning of a given word); 2) Using metaphors (idem, 
especially for relations between words or notions); 3) Using “feedforward” 
(taking into account the user, his past and his expectations, as far as 
possible); and 4) Using Basic English (a reduced set of precise words used 
as primitives).  
Concerning this last point, O&R think that it is possible to define a basic, 
controlled vocabulary insofar human feelings are excluded from this basic 
vocabulary (Ogden, 1930). The reduced vocabulary can be considered as a 
set of semantic primitives, and complex notions can be explained by 
combining these primitives. As we will see later on, this work received 
some echo from the Artificial Intelligence community since semantic 
primitives is a key component of any semantic analysis (especially Machine 
Translation that requires an interlingua, cf. Léon, 2007).  
3 Reception of O&R’s work by Wittgenstein 
Wittgenstein was a close colleague of O&R in Cambridge. Ogden translated 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus in 1921-1922, which mainly 
concerns meaning (it is in fact mainly F. Ramsey (1903–1930), then 
Ogden’s student in Cambridge, who did the work).  
3.1 Echoes between theories 
One of the key point of W’s book (among many others) is to separate what 
can be said from what cannot be said (from a logical and philosophical point 
of view). Is meaningful only what corresponds to basic facts and logical 
deduction (therefore, philosophy has nothing to say about religion or 
aesthetics, which are based on personal beliefs). From this point of view, 
there are clearly some echoes between W.’ theory and O&R’s book. 
Ogden thought that the Meaning of Meaning was an answer that could solve 
the problems raised in the Tractatus. For W. as well as for O&R, words 
correspond to objects, relations express connections between objects and the 
language reflects the structure of the world. Meaning is related to a proper 
analysis of relations between basic objects of the world and logical 
deductions from these relations. O&R just add the problem of personal 
experience (the emotive language).  
Moreover, both books claim to have a therapeutic function. Wittgenstein 
wants to cure philosophy from false problems (problems that cannot be 
solved by logical deductions from basic facts, cf. religion, aesthetics) 
whereas O&R want to cure communications from misunderstandings. They 
both propose solutions to solve this problem.  
3.2 Wittgenstein’s reaction 
Given the echoes between these books, Ogden believed that the Meaning of 
Meaning went some way towards providing a causal solution to the problem 
of meaning as outlined in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein then felt obliged to 
give an appraisal of the book, and he answered frankly that in his view, 
Ogden had not entirely grasped the problems which he had tackled in the 
Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1973: 69). 
In a letter to Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) on 7 April 1923, he went further 
on the subject of The Meaning of Meaning: “Is it not a miserable book?! 
Philosophy is not as easy as that! The worst thing is the introduction of 
Professor Postgate Litt. D. F. B. A. etc. etc. I have seldom read anything so 
foolish.” (Monk, 1991: 214).  
Why this reaction from Wittgenstein? No clear and explicit reason explains 
the reaction from Wittgenstein. As far as we know, Wittgenstein himself 
never wrote an explicit and sound critic of O&R’s book. However, different 
elements may be meaningful. 
Some authors, among others Jerzy Perzanowski (1993), suggest that W. 
defends a radically different philosophical point of view than the one 
expressed by O&R, even if Ogden did not see the point in 1923. As 
explained by Perzanowski, in the Tractatus, W. establishes a direct 
connection between words and objects, thus defending direct reference. Of 
course, if one takes this interpretation for granted, there is a huge mismatch 
between O&R and Wittgenstein’s theory, since O&R write, concerning 
direct reference: “Such shorthands as the word ‘means’ is constantly used 
so as to imply a direct simple relation between words and things, phrases 
and situations. If such relations could be admitted, then there would be of 
course no problem as to the nature of Meaning, and the vast majority of 
those who have been concerned with it would have been right in their 
refusal to discuss it. But too many interesting developments have been 
occurring in sciences (…) for any naive theory that ‘meaning’ is just 
‘meaning’ to be popular at the moment”.  (The Meaning of Meaning, p. 13).  
3.3 The Meaning of Meaning, a “so foolish” book? 
In 1923, for Wittgenstein, emotive language is for sure not a philosophical 
question. We should note, however, the so-called “second” W. (after his 
return to Cambridge in 1929) will develop a quite different theory. The later 
W. defends the position that words are not directly connected to objects in 
the world (and the structure of a language does not directly correspond to 
the structure of the world). Instead, the meaning of a word corresponds to its 
use, and context is highly relevant for meaning.  
But the most obvious explanation for W. negative reaction is probably that 
the aim of the two books is just different. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein is 
only interested in logic and philosophy (and not in communication). The 
Tractatus only concerns philosophy, thus emotive language is not a point 
addressed by Wittgenstein, nor does The Meaning of Meaning gives any 
new insight to the philosophical problems addressed by Wittgenstein. The 
fact that the two books do not concern the same range of matters may 
explains W.’s reaction: “Philosophy is not as easy as that!” (Monk, 1991: 
214).  
4 Why is The Meaning of Meaning still influential today? 
If one believes in O&R’s theory, it seems possible to define a language (or 
an interlingua), made of unambiguous meanings (a.k.a. semantic primitives), 
provided that the emotive dimension of language is excluded. In this 
perspective, the book from O&R is the source of two kinds of applications: 
− The definition of an unambiguous language for enhanced (human) 
communication 
− The definition of an unambiguous language for computer-based 
applications (especially in Artificial Intelligence). 
Ogden himself developed the Basic English in the 1930s, as aforementioned. 
This project was aimed at enhancing human communication by the 
definition of words from sets of unambiguous primitives.  
Beyond human communication, the question of semantic primitives is a 
classical problem of Artificial intelligence (AI), especially for Machine 
Translation. In this field, the key point is to define the semantics of words 
(or phrases) so that the best equivalent in the target language can be found3. 
To go ahead with a precise example, we will take a look at the CLRU 
(Cambridge Language Research Unit). Among the numerous teams that 
have been interested in Machine Translation, the CLRU is especially 
important: this group was a prototypical example of research in the domain 
in the 1950s. Created in Cambridge (UK) in 1955, the CLRU was a small 
research unit interested in Machine Translation. It was directed by Margaret 
Masterman (1910–1986), a former student of Wittgenstein. Masterman 
largely acknowledged her inspiration from Wittgenstein, but only from the 
second Wittgenstein (Masterman, 2005). She regularly mixed in Cambridge 
with scholars like Ivor A. Richards, the co-author of the Meaning of 
Meaning; following this tradition, she insisted on the importance of 
semantics rather than syntax for Machine Translation, which makes her 
approach highly original (see Léon, 2000).  
Some years before (in the 1930s and 1940s), as we have seen in the previous 
                                                
3 For the Semantic Web, the main goal is to allow computers to communicate between them, 
using unambiguous identifiers corresponding to objects and relations. These identifiers are 
then supposed to be mapped to chunks of texts, so that ambiguous natural language texts 
can be formalized using an unambiguous corresponding formalism expressing their content. 
Though, references to O&R are very frequent in the Semantic Web community, since this 
project is very close to the one of O&R (one can draw a parallel between the Basic English 
and the project of the Semantic Web, cf. Buitelaar et al., 2005 to take a recent example 
among many others). 
section, several considerations, among other the fact that literal meaning 
does not correspond to meaning as such, pushed Wittgenstein back to 
philosophy. W. then developed a complex philosophical investigation of 
language (Wittgenstein, 1953). This investigation did not include the 
emotive language of O&R as such but W. introduced the idea of language 
games, that is to say the fact that context and situations have an impact on 
meaning4. The change is radical compared to the Tractatus where is 
defended the idea of direct reference, that is to say a direct correspondence 
between the language and the world. In the Investigations, W. strongly 
advocates a situation-based conception of meaning, which had a prominent 
influence on Masterman. To be more precise, the second W. defends the 
notion of language use and language game and gives emphasis to 
perceptions, feelings and situations. So, from a O&R’ perspective, the 
second W. philosophy, in a way, integrates emotional language. However, 
W. did not make any reference to O&R’ theory. Moreover, there is still 
(from W.’s point of view) one fundamental flaw in O&R’ theory: no 
unambiguous language can be defined, since ambiguity is an inherent part 
of any language.  
Taking inspiration from this tradition, in the 1950s, like most other AI 
groups, the CLRU was torn between two opposite conceptions: 1) the 
                                                
4 The slogan “you shall know a word by the company its keeps”, later introduced by Firth 
(1957:11) takes his inspiration from the same observations as the one made by W. 
necessity to find an interlingua for machine translation, based on a set of 
linguistic primitive (semantic correspondences between languages); 2) the 
fact that words do not have a clear, precise meaning but are ambiguous and 
depend from the way they are used in language games (i.e. depends on 
experience and, more generally, on the context). The first conception is the 
one defended by W. in the Tractatus, the second one in the Philosophical 
Investigations. Masterman was largely influenced by this last position.  
However, the CLRU’s interest for semantic primitives, forming a kind of 
language game, is closer to the first position rather than to the second one. 
Y. Wilks (1939–), a former student of Masterman and the editor of a book 
gathering her most important works (Masterman, 2005) stresses that 
Masterman was highly influenced by the stick pictures of the language 
books, seen as a product of W’s “forms of life” (Masterman, 2005, p. 215). 
As a matter of fact, Basic English can be seen as a practical experiment in 
W’s language games (moreover, Masterman will develop a similar approach 
to the one from Ogden, using Chinese characters as primitives instead of 
English words, under the influence of M.A.K. Halliday (1925–), then a 
reader in Chinese in Cambridge). The contradiction between a static 
unambiguous conception of meaning and a dynamic, situation-based 
alternative one is here apparent. In a recent paper, Wilks suggests that the 
contradiction can be solved if one postulates a non logical but practical and 
empirical approach to semantic primitives. According to him, primitives can 
be organised as to form a language, but this language, like every human 
language, remains ambiguous. However, each primitive from this language 
subsumed sets of word, thus forming a semi-formal language, which is half 
way between human languages and formal approaches, especially formal 
ontologies. By stacking such representation levels, we may obtain a 
compatible abstract representation of complex domains.  
It is not clear whether this approach can solve the problem. Wilks observes 
that the web is a sea of text and has expanded without any major problem. 
Wilks (2006) assumes that a series of applications and domains will 
progressively be formalized using this “not so formal” approach. An 
increasing part of world will thus be modelled and computers will be able to 
communicate between them across these domains without any major 
problem. The whole approach is based on the assumption that the only way 
to model a language is the language itself, leaving alone the distinction 
between what is formal and what is not. However, no clear of this claim has 
been made so far, since primitives remains undefined in this approach! 
5 Conclusion 
In this article, we have shown the complex network of influences between 
Wittgenstein, Ogden & Richards and recent research in AI. We have seen 
two opposite directions: 1) the belief that context and language use is 
fundamental and 2) the interest/need for semantic primitives seen as a set of 
basic units that can be used as an interlingua. This problem is still open 
today and no answer seems to have been proposed that would solved it 
definitively. It is thus highly relevant to keep in mind historical research 
since it is highly valuable to highlight recent discussions in the literature.  
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